VIEWS & REVIEWS Ontology without Axiokogy? A Review of Masao Abe\u27s Account of the Problem of Good & Evil from a Western Philosophical Perspective by Kim BockJa
VIEWS AND REVIEWS
Ontology without Axiology?
A Review of Masao Abe’s Account of 
the Problem of Good and Evil 
from a Western Philosophical Perspective
K IM  bockJ a
Preface
THIS essay is a Western philosophical reflection on the Zen Buddhist ac­count o f  the problem of the dualism of good and evil as expounded by 
Masao Abe. It will be done by way o f a careful textual examination o f Abe’s 
recent book, Zen and Western Thought.
Masao Abe, the representative scholar o f Zen Buddhism of the Kyoto 
school, argues that the “ dualistic” perspective on ultimate reality in Western 
philosophy and religion (Christianity) fails to grasp the true meaning o f “ self­
transcendence,” and to this extent fails to solve the problem of human suffer­
ing. In other words, inasmuch as soteriology is fundamentally directed at the 
problem of good and evil, Western/Christian soteriology is systematically 
defective because it loses sight of the nondualism o f the problem of good and 
evil.1
Though Abe’s approach to solving the problem of good and evil by virtue 
of the Buddhist nondualism is illuminating, I would propose that Christianity 
is not as defective at handling the problem as Abe would have us believe. 
First, Christian theology is not entirely based on the dualistic purview of the 
problem of good and evil as Abe conceives; and, second, the Christian under­
standing of ultimate reality in terms o f the divine unity o f a Supreme Being 
and the Good would seem to avail a better philosophical foundation for a posi-
1 See Masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, ed., William R. LaFleur (Honolulu: 
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tive and creative soteriology at both the individual and social levels than 
would the Buddhist nondualistic doctrine of “ Emptiness.” That is, the prob­
lem of good and evil seems to be articulated more “ positively”  in Christian 
theology as formulated primarily in the Platonic tradition of Western 
philosophy than in the Mahayana tradition of Buddhism, inasmuch as the Pla- 
tonic/Christian identification of Being and Good, i.e., the marriage of ontolo­
gy and axiology, provides a more “ positive”  and “ life-affirming” philosophy 
of values and meanings than the Buddhist philosophy of “ Ontological Empti­
ness,” which is, we shall argue, axiologically empty.
Further, just as Judaeo-Christianity conceives of God in terms of Being and 
the Good, Platonism likewise identifies Being with the Good. This Platonic- 
Christian inseparability of ontology and axiology seems to provide a more 
positive worldview than the Buddhist doctrine of pratitya-samutpada, or de­
pendent origination, and sunyata, or the nonsubstantiality of all things, a doc­
trine that entails the separation of ontology from axiology.2
Depending on whether the perennial question of good and evil is dealt with 
on the basis of the ontological Emptiness of Buddhism, or the ontological 
Being of Platonic Christianity, the axiological implication is either negative or 
positive. Given that the problem of good and evil is constitutive of the Bud­
dhist way to Absolute Freedom (moksha) and the Christian way to Salvation, 
the Ultimate goals of these two religious paths may not be as divergent as they 
first seem to appear. But the difference in the doctrinal orientations of the two 
religions—one toward Emptiness and the other toward Being—may give rise 
to marked differences in their impact in the social-ethical spheres.
Though one can no doubt recognize the existence of both the individual and 
the social dimensions of soteriology (which is a Christian term) in Buddhism, 
one cannot but wonder how much emphasis has been placed on the socio- 
ethical aspect of soteriology in practice. Yet ironically, no other nonbuddhist 
philosophy seems to be more profoundly equipped than the Buddhist doctrine 
of dependent origination in providing a theoretical basis for the social and 
even the cosmological dimensions of soteriology.
What is puzzling to my mind is that in Buddhism the ultimate concern seems 
to be ultimately an individualistic one, being fundamentally oriented to the 
individual liberation from suffering (dukkha) rather than to social-ethical 
transformation, as.is the case in Christianity. But is this not precisely what 
separates Mahayana from Theravada Buddhism in their respective soteriologi- 
cal orientations? How then do we account for this gap between theory and 
practice in Buddhism? The truth is, let us submit, that even the seemingly so- 
cio-oriented soteriology of Mahayana Buddhism does not fulfill, in practice
2 I will elaborate on this point in greater detail below.
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and reality, its goal of universal salvation. Why then does Buddhist pratitya- 
samutpada—philosophically convincing and sophisticated as it is in providing 
the theoretical foundation for a soteriology in socio-ethical terms—fail to 
produce the intended practical results? It is perhaps because the Buddhist ulti­
mate goal is “ Emptiness,”  as Fritz Buri points out.
For what happens is that the interdependence of all things as implicated in 
the doctrine of dependent origination ends up in a wholesale “ liquidation” 
into the One Infinite Ocean of Emptiness in which nothing really “ is,” and to 
that extent, nothing has any values. And since there is no ontology of 
“ being,”  there needs not be any axiology to deal with. Thich Nhat Hanh has 
warned against this extreme emphasis on the Buddhist Emptiness that often 
becomes itself another “ thing” to be attached to.3 In the same vein, Fritz Buri 
also points out the negative character of the Buddhist Emptiness:
3 Thich Nhat Hanh says, “ The Buddha emphasized the teachings o f  non-Atman 
(non-self). He said, ‘Things are empty o f  a separate, independent self. If you look for 
the self o f  a flower, you will see that it is empty.* But when Buddhists began worship­
ping the idea o f  emptiness, he said, ‘It is worse if  you get caught in the non-self o f  a 
flower than if you believe in the self o f  a flower* ”  (Living Buddha, Living Christ [New 
York: Riverhead Books, 19951, 54).
4 Fritz Buri, “ History o f  Problems,”  Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: M utual Renew­
al and Transformation, ed., Paul O. Ingram, Frederick J. Streng (Honolulu: Univer­
sity o f  Hawai‘i Press, 1986), 31.
The impressive greatness of Buddhism consists in this freedom from 
the world within the world. But therein also lies Buddhism’s prob­
lematic. Ultimate seriousness, engagement, and responsibility are 
difficult to realize in this attitude toward the world, in the idea Bud­
dhists have about their own selves, and in their behaviour toward 
other beings. The Buddhist is in danger of withdrawing into ultimate 
noncommitment (italics mine). He can as easily refer to the connec­
tion of all things in no-thing-ness as they can, by regarding them as 
nothing, negate that connection.4
This extreme negative character of the Buddhist ultimate goal, i.e., Absolute 
Freedom from ontological, cosmological, and axiological discourses, is not to 
be based on anything or any being but Emptiness. Ultimate Reality as ontolog­
ical Emptiness necessarily entails the emptying out all worldly matters, includ­
ing, of course, the axiological question of what is good and evil upon which 
our ordinary everyday life is socio-ethically conducted.
My suggestion in this matter is that Buddhist ontological emptiness must 
not be empty of axiological matters. To be sure, Good and Evil may not, and
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should not, be conceived as substantial, objective entities, as Abe insists. But 
still, there is, as experiential facts, that which is good and evil, which cannot 
be simply dismissed as unreal or illusory. The distinction of Good and Evil 
cannot be disregarded as pointless as Abe argues. One cannot live in a com­
plete axiological void as long as one lives in this phenomenal world, even if the 
ultimate reality of this world is, as Buddhism affirms, “ ontologically void.** 
Granted that this phenomenal world may ultimately be illusory, it is nonethe­
less a “ transcendental illusion/'3 as Kant puts it; that is, to say, it is an illu­
sion which cannot be dismissed but must be dealt with and lived through, even 
after it was detected as illusion.
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New 
York: St Martin’s Press, 1965), A 297-298.
6 Abe, Zen and Western Thought, 132.
7 Ibid. 115.
Abe's Dualism o f Ontology and Axiology
However imperative it may seem from the ethical point of view, it is, 
according to Buddhism, illusory to believe it possible to overcome 
evil with good and to thereby attain the highest good. Since good 
and evil are mutually negating principles with equal power, an ethi­
cal effort to overcome evil with good never succeeds and results in a 
serious dilemma. Realizing this existential dilemma innate in human 
existence and characterizing it in terms of original sin, Christians 
have propounded the necessity of faith in God who delivers man 
from sin through his redemptive activity. From a Christian perspec­
tive, God himself is Good with a capital “ G ,"  as can be noted in the 
Biblical statement, “ No one is good, but God alone" (Mark 10:18, 
Luke 18:19). Since the law is the expression of God's will, obedience 
and disobedience to the law constitute man's good and evil. 
Moreover, it is emphasized, “ Do not be overcome by evil, but over­
come evil with good" (Rom. 12:21)5 6
Zen grasped the problem of good and evil not as a problem of free 
will, but as that of the discriminating mind (italics mine) which distin­
guishes the two dimensions of good and evil. Zen advocated that we 
must awaken to No-mind itself, which transcends all discrimination. 
This was the Zen position of Subjective “ Nothingness’ "  (Mu) which 
is not I/.7
In the above passages Abe maintains that Buddhist philosophy provides a bet-
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ter solution to the problem of existential suffering on account o f its nondualis- 
tic ontology o f being/nonbeing and its correlative nondualistic axiology of 
good and evil, than does Western philosophy in the Platonic-Aristotelian and 
Christian tradition. Abe argues that because the latter is constituted by an on* 
tological dualism of being and nonbeing and correlatively an axiological dual­
ism o f good and evil, it has difficulty in solving the problem of existential 
suffering. For the very cause o f suffering is not to be rooted in any substantial, 
objective entity, but in the subjective “ ignorance** o f the nonsubstantiality 
and impermanence o f things to which we attach ourselves. In Abe's view, this 
intrinsic limitation o f human existence can only be transcended by “ awaken­
ing into” the nonsubstantiality o f the cause o f suffering. In other words, one 
attains to the Absolute Freedom, Nirvana, by awakening into the Absolute 
Emptiness o f all things.
I wonder if indeed the solution to the problem of good and evil can be 
found, as Abe asserts, in not clinging to the false belief that Good will con­
quer evil as Christianity does, but to awaken to the truth that good and evil 
have equal power, both o f which must be ultimately transcended. If this is so 
then it follows that salvation lies not in participating in any active engagement 
or transformation but in the passive and negative activity o f “emptying out” 
altogether the notion o f the very existence o f good and evil, for in reality, 
again according to Abe, “ existence” is no more than our mental fabrication.8 
Abe says:
To be emancipated from the existential antinomy o f good and evil 
and to awaken to Emptiness prior to the opposition between good 
and evil. In the existential awakening to Emptiness, one can be 
master of, rather than enslaved by, good and evil. In this sense, the 
realization o f true Emptiness is the basis for human freedom, crea­
tive activity, and ethical life.9
According to Abe then, good and evil are not objective entities either ontologi­
cally or axiologically, but are only an epistemological illusion in the existential 
dimension. Our discriminating mental activity is therefore the very source of 
evil, and for that reason, is itself evil because good and evil are not substantial 
but empty. My question is: how can one justify the evilness o f the discriminat­
ing mind when in this evilish discriminating mind there is not just the notion 
of evil alone but also the notion o f good? To put it another way, where does 
this idea o f “ good” come from if the discriminating mind is itself evil? If one 
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then there should not be, from the outset, the coexisting o f such discriminat­
ing concepts as good and evil. The answer to this question may be this: A  truly 
enlightened, thus truly liberated person, may be free from “ epistemological” 
query about what is good and evil, and thus he/she does not have to worry 
about “ doing” or “acting” good or bad. Just “ to be” itself for the enlight­
ened is Transcendently Good, meaning transcending from both the relative 
good and evil. And both the means and end of this status of the “Transcen­
dent Good” for Buddhism are Emptiness.
Would the individual awakening to the ontological nonexistence of good 
and evil alone suffice us to solve the phenomenal, socio-ethical problems in the 
world as Abe says that Buddhism teaches? In other words, would illusory 
phenomenal matters such as social justice and social transformation for the 
peace o f the world be simply dissolved into the world o f Empty Nirvana, the 
Eternal Peace, and Tranquility, if each individual awakens into the illusori­
ness o f the very desire or need for social peace? Granted that individual 
awakening into the Emptiness o f Nirvana and the dependent origination of all 
samsaric and phenomenal matters would indeed solve the problem, then when 
would it happen? Lin-chi would say, “ here and now,” otherwise “ never.” 
Lin-chi was indeed right only if “ here and now” were understood not as mere­
ly an individual awakening alone, but also as social and cosmological awaken­
ing, in which individual awakening is included. And who would be in charge 
of, or responsible for, leading all sentient beings to Nirvana if not members of 
the existing sentient community who are yet to be awakened? It seems to be a 
matter o f priority. By this I mean that although the idea of individual awaken­
ing into the nonexistence o f good and evil may well lead the world to Libera­
tion from suffering; but in reality the world has not yet been awakened as a 
whole.
It is worth noting that the Buddha’s Third Noble Truth, the cessation of 
Dukkha leading to Nirvana, does not seem to be much o f a social concept 
when, in fact, the Gautama Buddha, the noble awakened one, did not stay in 
Nirvana of the Eternal bliss o f Peace, but rather made his “ samsaric turn” 
back to the phenomenal world to show the way to liberation by becoming in­
volved with worldly matters. In other words, the Buddha’s personal awaken­
ing to the nonexistence o f good and evil led him to get involved with the very 
samsaric, worldly matters o f good and evil. His personal experience o f Enlight­
enment and Freedom was embodied in the very samsaric world with his Great 
Compassion for others. To this extent, the Buddha’s personal and individual 
awakening into Absolute Freedom was from beginning to end an ontological­
ly and axiologically social concept. The Absolute Freedom and Enlightenment 
of the Buddha was a social as well as an individual affair.
I would like to draw attention to the point that though the idea of the great
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Compassion, a social concept in essence, is an integral part o f Buddhism, an 
attempt to characterize Buddhism, as a socially oriental religion on account 
of this idea o f Compassion needs to be qualified. The reason is that in Bud­
dhism the very nature o f the Compassion for others is directed to the Empti­
ness of all things in which neither individual nor social salvation has contex­
tual being.
How could one be emancipated from the existential ontology o f good and 
evil without going “ through” and living “with”  good and evil? How could 
anyone make an “ontological leap” o f Emptiness from the existential and ax­
iological antinomy o f good and evil by “ doing away” with the latter? Let us 
take a moment to reflect on Abe’s logic of negativity versus positivity, which 
he applied to the characterization o f Eastern and Western religions, respec­
tively. I find this logic difficult to sustain. According to Abe, Positivity is the 
Ultimate character o f Western religion which holds the belief that the positive 
principle o f good overcomes the negative principle o f evil, whereas Negativity 
is the Ultimate principle o f Buddhism. But this contradicts what he says:•
By contrast, in the East, especially in Taoism and Buddhism, nega­
tive principles are not secondary but co-equal (italics mine) to the 




. . .  In short, the ultimate, which is beyond the opposition between 
positive and negative, is realized in the East in terms of negativity 
and in the West in terms o f positivity.11
How is it possible that the negative principle is co-equal to the positive princi­
ple and at the same time “ primary” and “ central”? If it were primary, then is 
it not an another principle to be distinguishable from the one that it is primary 
to? I suspect that Abe’s answer would make more sense if it were rectified as 
follows, i.e., that either the negative principle is co-equal with the positive 
principle in a relative sense, or the negative is primary or central to the positive 
in the absolute sense. If this is the case, then is not the negative principle 
(Emptiness) another illusory product of the positive/negative dualistic think­
ing? Does it not then lead to the paradoxical result that the Buddhist negative 
ultimate o f Emptiness and the Christian positive ultimate o f the Absolute 
Good are virtually the same and they differ only in the choice o f words?
I suggest that if the Buddhist ultimate is Emptiness, then it should not be 
cast in such transcendental language as “beyond” the “opposition o f the posi-
91
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H IS T  X X X I, 1
tive and negative/’ but should instead be included in the recognition that both 
the positive and the negative are the Ultimate, inasmuch as both are ontologi­
cally and axiologically empty.
Abe also says, “ although ethically speaking, good should have priority over 
evil; ontologically and existentially speaking, good is not stronger than evil, 
and good and evil have at least equal strength in their endless struggle with 
each other. Accordingly, it is necessary for Buddhists to overcome the good­
evil dichotomy itself and return to their original nature prior to the divergence 
between good and evil.” 12 My question regarding this passage is: what makes 
the “ original nature prior to the divergence between good and evil” the “ Ab­
solute Good” ? What is the point of endeavoring to name the unnamable and 
uncharacterizable Emptiness “ Absolute Good”  when indeed Emptiness is 
empty of good and evil? In other words, why does an axiological vocabulary, 
as “ Absolute Good” have to be used in the ontological context if the Ultimate 
is neither good nor evil but Emptiness? As I see it, if the Buddhist Emptiness is 
meant to be absolutely empty of everything, then even the axiological matters 
of good and evil should not be brought into the scene. We should simply say 
that there is no Good, not only good in the axiological sense of the relative 
good and evil, but even the Absolute Good whether it is “ prior to”  or “ be­
yond” the relative good and evil. Abe argues that Christian belief in the 
Supreme Good, i.e ., God, who eventually overcomes and conquers evil, is illu­
sory. But how is it existentially possible to separate ethical from ontological 
matters?
12 Abe, “ Problem o f Evil in Christianity and Buddhism,” Buddhist-Christian Dia­
logue: Mutual Renewal and Transformation, ed., Paul O. Ingram and Frederick J. 
Streng (Honolulu: University o f  Hawai’i Press, 1986), 142.
13 Dhammapada 183.
Let us examine how Buddhist moral codes deal with the problem of good 
and evil. There is no doubt that the Buddha acknowledges the “ existence”  of 
good and evil when he admonishes us: “ Do what is good, and do not do what 
is evil. Keep your mind pure, this is the teaching of Buddha.” 13 Buddhist 
ethics seems as strongly oriented toward practice as any other religion, and 
tremendous self-discipline is required in treading the Noble Eightfold Path. In 
the existential sense, the life of Gautama Buddha was indeed no more than the 
embodiment of his moral and ethical teachings. In other words, the means 
(moral life) and its end (the Transcendental Freedom) are not separable. 
Kalupahana articulates this point well:
Furthermore, the relationship between the Buddha's conceptions of 
the way and its goal could not be understood in terms of the popular
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theories of teleology or instrumentalism. These theories assume that 
the path is important and relevant only insofar as it leads to the 
desired goal. Once the goal is reached, the path becomes irrelevant. 
For the Buddha, the moral life that leads to ultimate freedom, or nir­
vana, does not become irrelevant once freedom is achieved.14
14 Kalupahana, Ethics in Early Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 
1995), 87.
15 Ibid. 18.
There is no doubt that Buddhism, being one of the noblest religions of the 
world, admonishes the good, and in fact the whole teachings of the Buddha’s 
Dhammapada is about practicing good and avoiding evil. What 1 would like 
to point out is that perhaps the extreme emphasis on Sunyata in Zen Buddhist 
tradition may have led to deviation from the original teachings of the Buddha 
in the Dhammapada. Buddhism is not deprived of the moral teachings of 
good and evil. There arc such moral teachings in Buddhism, which are not to 
be taken as a mere illusory fabrication o f the mind as some misinterpreters of 
Buddhism may hold. Kalupahana says:
It may be noted that the Buddha, who came after Purana, made a dis­
tinction between merit and demerit on the one hand, and good (kusa- 
la) and bad (akusala) on the other. For the sake of the unenlight­
ened, he allowed the idea that merit and demerit can be accumulated. 
However, the enlightened one, he maintained, is one who has 
renounced the ideas of merit and demerit, although not the concepts 
of good and bad. Promoting good was part of the ultimate teachings 
of the Buddha.15
Buddhism engages in no different moral and ethical discourses than other 
religions such as Christianity. Nirvana, the Ultimate Freedom, the Goal of 
Buddhism, is constituted by moral practices, i.e., doing good and avoiding 
evil. The Buddha’s original central teaching of nonsubstantiality and pratitya- 
samutpada are at heart ethical discourses. The Noble Eightfold Path is all 
about the “ right”  (not in any relative sense but in the absolute sense) ways to 
be liberated from the “ wrong”  ways of living. If the Eightfold Path is not 
zpso facto axiological in nature, then what else could it be?
I am not saying that Abe is unaware of the moral teachings o f the Buddha in 
the Dhammapada. He actually affirms it when he says, “ The emphasis on the 
solidarity between humanity and nature does not mean that Buddhism is in­
different to human ethics. In the Dhammapada, one of the oldest Buddhist 
scriptures, there is a well-known stanza: Not to commit evil, /But to do all
93
T H E  E A ST E R N  B U D D H IS T  X X X I, 1
that is good, and to purify one’s heart—This is the teaching of all the Bud­
dhas.” 16 Though Abe well acknowledges the existence and the significance of 
the moral teachings of the Buddha, his account of them does not seem to be 
central to his account of the Dhammapada when he says:
16 Abe, “ Problem o f Evil in Christianity and Buddhism,”  141-142.
17 Ibid. 142.
The point of this stanza lies precisely in the third line, that is, “ to 
purify one’s heart,”  and the first and the second lines, “ Not to com­
mit evils, But to do all that is good,”  should be understood from  the 
third line. (Italics mine) And “ to purify one’s heart”  even from the 
dualistic view of good and evil. Eventually the text enjoins us “ to 
awaken to the purity of one’s original nature”  or “ to awaken to the 
original purity of one’s nature”  which is beyond the duality of good 
and evil. The problem of good and evil must be coped with on the ba­
sis of awakening to the original purity o f one’s nature—that is, the 
teaching of all Buddhas.17
“ To purify one’s heart, not to commit evils, but to do all that is good”  is the 
core of Abe’s reading of the Dhammapada. 1 wonder whether Abe misreads 
the point of the Dhammapada whose emphasis is solely on the “ practice”  of 
“ morality,” i.e., “ doing”  good and “ avoiding”  evil. This is certainly not a 
matter of theory, nor even a matter of mere “ existential-epistemological 
awakening”  to the nonexistence of good and evil, but most emphatically a 
matter of conduct. In the above passage Abe’s emphasis is clearly placed on 
the role of active awakening into the nondualism of good and evil as the pri­
mary factor in the Buddha’s teachings.
I also disagree with Abe’s equalization of the Buddhist “ original purity of 
one’s nature prior to good and evil”  to the Judeo-Christian idea of the Good 
prior to the Fall of Adam when he says:
This Buddhist notion of “ the original purity of one’s nature,”  rough­
ly speaking, may be taken to be somewhat equivalent to the state of 
Adam before eating the fruit of knowledge of good and evil. It is to 
be back where, according to Genesis, “ God saw everything that he 
had made, and, behold, it was very good.” Therefore, God blessed 
Adam because he was good. Does the term “ good” in this connec­
tion simply mean good in the ethical sense? I do not think so. The 
term “ good” God used to evaluate his act of creation is not good as 
distinguished from evil, but the original goodness prior to the duality 
between good and evil, that is, the original goodness prior to man’s
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corruption of the primordially good nature of mankind and the 
world. It is good not in the ethical sense, but in the ontological sense. 
The goodness o f  Adam as created by God is, roughly speaking, 
equivalent to the original purity o f  one’s nature as understood in 
Buddhism (italics mine). “ The original face at the very moment of 
not thinking of good and evil”  requested by the sixth Zen patriarch, 
Hui-neng, is simply another term for one’s original nature, which is 
pure, beyond good and evil? Thus Buddhism often refers to our origi­
nal nature as “ Buddha-nalure,”  the awakening to which provides 
the basis for human ethics to be properly established.18
I would maintain that the Christian Original Good cannot be taken as equiva­
lent to the Buddhist “ original purity”  in Abe’s sense, for the Christian Origi­
nal Good was not that which was “ empty”  o f anything at all, but that which 
was “ Being,”  and which by virtue of “ being”  good, evil was already impreg­
nated with it as its dialectical counterpart. Nor can the Christian Good be the 
“ ontological”  good as Abe reads. “ Good”  and “ Evil,”  by definition, are not 
ontological but axiological concepts. And if the Good is thought of in terms 
of ontological Emptiness, then why bother calling it good at all?
I would like to draw attention to the point that Abe’s “ original purity prior 
to the discernment of good and evil” that the Buddhists seek as their ultimate 
goal cannot be sustained with full justifications without the acknowledgement 
of the duality of good and evil. As a matter of fact, it is only after acknowledg­
ing the duality and then overcoming it that the original purity can be of any 
value. In other words, one cannot expect the ontology to be separable from 
the axiology. Therefore, I find it difficult to make sense out of Abe’s “ origi­
nal” purity unless there is to be found a “ valuational,”  “ axiological” conno­
tation to it.
Abe’s insistence on the necessity of the separation of the ontological good 
from the axiological good for the sake of preserving “ the Original Purity of 
one’s nature”  would be better served by claiming the inseparability of ontolo­
gy and axiology, thus providing the theoretical basis for a “ positive” account 
of phenomenal and mundane matters and socio-ethical concerns. And this is 
where the merit of the Western, Platonic philosophy shines. For Plato, ontolo­
gy is axiology and axiology is ontology. As Abe also sees it, the Christian Ulti­
mate, God, is the Absolute Good. Both the Being and the Goodness of God 
are God’s characters. I disagree with Abe’s contention that axiology for Chris­
tianity is more fundamental than ontology. Abe says:
My understanding is that when Christianity emphasizes the one God
*• Ibid. 142-43.
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who is the ruler of the universe and history, who is the absolute good 
and eternal life, who can overcome death and evil, etc., this is not 
simply an ontological issue, but rather an axiological issue. In Christi­
anity the most significant point is not the issue of being and non- 
being, but the question of what I as a human being ought to do. (ital­
ics mine)19
For my understanding of Christianity, axiology and ontology co-exist with 
equal weight and require each other as dialectical complements, “ like the two 
broken halves of the same coin which necessarily fit each other's cavities and 
bulges.” 20 However in Buddhism, according to Abe, ontology has priority 
over axiology. Still I do not see any sense of “ priority” in Buddha’s teaching 
of Emptiness. If Emptiness is truly empty and to that extent enables us to live 
our life in the most fulfilling manner, then neither ontology nor axiology 
should be comparable in any manner whatsoever. My view is that both ontolo­
gy and axiology must be considered equal partners in the dialectical sense. The 
difference between Buddhism and Christianity in this regard is that while the 
former takes it as a negative term, the latter a positive one.
Was the Fall o f  Eve21 an Accidental Sin or Necessary Enlightenment?
Another point I would like to draw attention is that the Buddhist Emptiness 
cannot be characterized in any specific, concrete manner except as “ nihil” 
whereas the Christian Being is characterized as being in some specific way such 
as being the Good. Abe says:
In the ethical dimension, it functions as the source of evil as the priva­
tion of good. But in the religious dimension peculiar to Christianity, 
which is based on personal God, nihility is not merely a privation of 
good, but is rather the source of sin as the rebellion against the will 
of God, the negative principle in human life which constantly tries to 
undermine God’s essential goodness.22
I disagree with the above argument that in Judeo-Christianity, “ nihility” is 
the source of sin. It seems to me that Evil was not caused by “ nihil”  but by
*’ Masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, 192.
20 I owe this expression to J. N. Findlay from his The Transcendence o f the Cave 
(New York: Allen Unwin, 1969), 68.
21 It is to be noted that it was Eve not Adam who took the initiative in violating the 
Divine commandments. Adam played a passive role to be persuaded by his spouse, 
Eve, who actively and courageously embodied her desire to attain Divine Knowledge.
22 Abe, Masao, Zen and Western Thought, 123.
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“ something,” i.e., human desire, the will to attain Divine Wisdom by going 
beyond human finitude. What made Eve fall prey to the proposition o f the ser­
pent was her desire to obtain Divine Wisdom. The Book of Genesis reads:
“You will not surely die” the serpent said to the woman. “ For God 
knows that when you eat o f it your eyes will be opened, and you will 
be like God, knowing good and evil.” When the woman saw that the 
fruit o f the tree was good for food and pleasing to the eye, and also 
desirable for gaining wisdom, she took some and ate it. She also gave 
some to her husband, who was with her, and he ate it. Then the eyes 
o f both o f them were opened.23
It was human desire or will, not “ nihil,” that was condemned as a deadly sin 
by Christianity. I would like to draw attention to several points here: first, it 
was Eve, not Adam, to whom the serpent approached. Why? Perhaps the cun­
ning serpent knew that Eve, not Adam, had a desire to go beyond human fini- 
tude? Secondly, Eve had not only the desire to obtain the Divine Wisdom but 
also compassion for her other, her fellow human, so that she shared the Di­
vine Wisdom with her other, i.e., Adam. And Eve’s compassion for her other 
may be likened to the Bodhisattva's compassion for all sentient beings in Bud­
dhism. My point is that there is no textual ground upon which Abe's argument 
for “nihil” as the cause of sin in Judeo-Christianity can stand.
In line with the story o f the Fall, it may also be worth noting that Buddhism 
encourages the attainment of Transcendental Wisdom in order to attain Free­
dom from suffering, whereas Judeo-Christianity prohibits it. The spiritual 
history o f Judeo-Christianity may indeed be summed up in term o f a dialecti­
cal tension between human desire/will to become like God and God’s prohibi­
tion o f it. But is this not the very dialectical tension that is also behind the hu­
man striving to grasp the unattainable, transcendental Good? In other words, 
is it not the case that in each moment o f the spiritual journey to the ultimate 
goal (perfection/liberation) there is already implicit in it the goal itself? I pre­
sume that both Christianity and Buddhism agree on this matter. If for Bud­
dhism Enlightenment (the goal) is already attained here and now, the same is 
for Christianity. Jesus says, “ Be ye perfect as the Father in Heaven is per­
fect,” and “The Kingdom of Heaven is in and among us.”
Returning to our original discussion, Abe holds that by means o f negative 
annihilation Buddhists try to go beyond the duality of good and evil so as to 
be awakened into Sunyata,S in which both good and evil are transcended. As 
long as we remain in duality, we are involved in and limited by it. Abe says, 
“There is no final rest in the realm of good and evil. To attain the abode of
23 Genesis, 3: 4-7.
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final rest, we must go beyond the dichotomy of good and evil and return to the 
root and source from which good and evil emerged.’*24 “ Abiding in the final 
rest” is not an exclusively Buddhist idea. Christianity also shares this idea of 
going beyond the world of good and evil to the abode of the final rest depicted 
as the Kingdom of God. No secular matters such as marriage are expected to 
exist in the Transcendent Kingdom of Heaven. Jesus said, “ At the resurrec­
tion people will neither marry nor be given in marriage: they will be like the an­
gels in Heaven.” 25 Whatever be the nature of the final rest, whether it be the 
“ empty”  rest of the Buddhist Emptiness or the “ rich”  rest of the Christian 
Kingdom of Heaven, what I believe to be at issue here is not the end itself, but 
rather the means to the end. Depending on whether the means is taken in a 
positive or a negative term, the meaning of the end can be quite different. In 
Buddhism, the end is to be attained by means of a passive attitude, i.e., 
neglect of social engagement, whereas in Christianity, it is to be consummated 
by means of active social change as well as individualistic change26 directed to 
the final goal of the Kingdom of God, which is Absolute Being, not Empti­
ness. It may not be unjust to say that Buddhism by and large overlooks the 
awareness and appreciation of the social dimension of ontological rest.
24 Abe, Zen and Western Thought, 123.
25 Gospel According to M atthew, 22:30.
:6 It goes without saying that in the Christian tradition there have also been passive, 
renunciative, and spiritually emphasized disciplines practiced by such brothers and sis­
ters like St. Francis and St. Teresa. The mystical tradition o f  Christianity such as 
Meister Eckhart and Jacob Bdhme also shares the spiritual negativity with Buddhism.
27 Masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, 128.
M Ibid. 127.
Nondualism o f  the Christian Idea o f  the Good
Being the complete counter-concept to u, mu is more than privation 
of u, a stronger form of negativity than “ nonbeing” as understood 
in the West. Further, u and mu are completely antagonistic princi­
ples and therefore inseparable from one another, and thus constitute 
an antinomy, a self-contradiction. The Buddhist idea of Sunyata 
shows that standpoint realized through overcoming that antinomic, 
self-contradictory oneness of u and mu.27
The above passage seems to suggest that Western intellectual discourse on the 
ontological priority of Being over the negative principle of Sunyata is an illu­
sion, and that the Zen understanding of the co-equality of the positive and 
negative principles in the dialectical structure of Sunyata2* is the solution to
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the problem of good and evil. U (being) has no ontological priority to Mu 
(nonbeing). I would like to point out that Abe’s account of the “ dualistic” na­
ture of good and evil of Christianity is a misunderstanding. As St. Augustine 
rightly said that evil has no “ being”  of its own, but if it does, then only to the 
extent that it is a privation of the Good.
As far as evil being the “ privation”  of the good, it has no place to stand 
alone as an independent entity against the good, but has only a parasitic, and 
perhaps to that extent illusory and not substantial existence upon the good. In 
other words, as far as the Christian conception is concerned, good and evil are 
nondualistic. St. Augustine elaborates this point in his Confessions:
It was made clear to me also that even those things that are subject to 
decay are good. If they were of the supreme order o f goodness, they 
could not become corrupt; but neither could they become corrupt un­
less they were in some way good. For if they were supremely good, it 
would not be possible for them to be corrupted. On the other hand, 
if they were entirely without good, there would be nothing in them 
that could become corrupt. For corruption is harmful, but unless it 
diminished what is good, it could do no harm. The conclusion then 
must be either that corruption does no harm—which is not possible; 
or that everything which is corrupted is deprived of good—which is 
beyond doubt. But if they are deprived of all good, they will not exist 
at all . . . .  So it became obvious to me that all that you have made is 
good, and that there are no substances whatsoever that were not 
made by you. And because you did not make them all equal, each sin­
gle thing is good and collectively they are very good, for our God 
made his whole creation very good . . .  So we must conclude that i f  
things are deprived o f  all good, they cease altogether to be; and this 
means that as long as they are, they are good. Therefore, whatever is, 
is good and evil, the origin o f  which I  was trying to find, is not a sub­
stance, because i f  it were substance, it would be good (italics mine).29
Recapitulating the above phrases, according to Augustine, there is no evil be­
cause whatever is is good because whatever is is a creation of God who is 
Good. So there is no place for evil in Christianity. Thus Evil cannot “ be.” 
Evil thus is “ Privatio Boni.”  The Evil in Christianity has no “ substance”  of 
its own as Plotinus and Augustine painstakingly elaborated. Though the prob­
lem of Theodicy expounded by Augustine is still problematic, the very idea 
that there “ is” only good, and evil “ is not”  is an invincible fortress against
29 St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (New York: Penguin Books, 
1978), 148.
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the accusation of being dualistic. So it is a misconception on Abe’s part to ren­
der to Christianity the “ dualism”  of good and evil.
Life and Death vs. Good and Evil?
Abe says,
In Zen the ontological aspect, the question of being and nonbeing, 
life and death, is much more central than the issue of good and evil. 
On the other hand, in Christianity the issue of good and evil is much 
more strongly emphasized than the question of being and non- 
being.” 30
I find it difficult to be persuaded that the primary concerns for the Buddhists 
are life and death, or Being and nonbeing, whereas the primary concerns for 
Christianity are good and evil. Indeed, it seems that in Zen ontology is central. 
But in Abe’s view, that is not the case in Christianity, where the axiological 
issue of good and evil is emphasized more strongly than ontology. I question 
whether the matter of being and nonbeing can be thought of separately from 
good and evil. In other words whether the ontology of our existence can make 
sense at all without the axiology of good and evil from the perspective of the 
existential dimension of daily life. How could a mode of being be at all within 
a total axiological vacuum? Does not this way of thinking result in a dualism 
of axiology and ontology? It seems that the separation of axiology from ontol­
ogy is another form of dualism that Buddhism itself abhors so much. How 
then can Buddhism be exempt from being trapped in the dualistic view of on­
tology and axiology? Ironically, then, we find no dualism of ontology and axi­
ology in Christianity and Platonic philosophy. Again, I would like to empha­
size that Christianity is not as dualistic as Abe understands it from the Zen 
Buddhist point of view.31
Another disagreement with Abe’s account of the Western conception of on­
tology and axiology is that giving concrete and specific characteristic to 
“ Being” does not make for the dualism of ontology and axiology. Quite to 
the contrary, concreteness, specificity, and particularity are essential to ontolo­
gy. Being must “ be in some way or other,” otherwise, it would be a “ lifeless” 
and “ insipid” nihil that is indeed being praised as the final goal of Buddhism, 
i.e., Emptiness.
Lao-tzu seems to share this Buddhist idea of Emptiness as the “ character­
less”  and “ unnamable” Ultimate whose center is not moving, like the center 
of the wheel that remains motionless. “ It is the empty space which makes a ves-
*  Abe, Zen and Western Thought, 193. 31 I will elaborate in more detail below.
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sei useful.” 32 Indeed, there is profound truth to the Taoist conception o f the 
Tao as Nonbeing (Emptiness). However, I would like to point out that by the 
same token, the reversal o f the idea of the usefulness o f useless is also true. 
What makes the empty space useful is the “ nonemptiness” of things that co­
exist with the former. Emptiness (Mu) requires Being just as much as Being 
(17) requires Emptiness. They are the two sides o f the same token which re­
quire each other. Thus the one-sided emphasis on the truth o f Emptiness is my­
opic and needs to be opened dialectically to the “ fusion o f the horizon.”
32 Lao-tzu, Tao Te Ching, “ Thirty spokes share the wheel’s hub; It is the center hole 
that makes it useful. Shape clay into a vessel; It is the space within that makes it use­
ful. Cut doors and windows for a room; It is the holes which make it useful. There­
fore profit comes from what is there; Usefulness comes from what is not there,”  trans. 
Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), Chapter 11.
33 Lin-chi, The Zen Teachings o f  M aster Lin-ehi, trans. Burton Watson (Shambha­
la, Boston, 1993), verse 19, p. 52.
Abe is right, though, in saying that good and evil are not “ ontological 
matters but ethical matters.” Indeed, good and evil are value-concepts, not on­
tological concepts. However, this does not necessarily justify the Buddhist dis­
dain o f value-related matters as mere illusions. Our world, being phenomenal­
ly conditioned, cannot but be sustained by value-oriented life alone. Whether 
the ultimate reality is ontological Emptiness or ontological Being, phenom­
enal matters cannot but be articulated axiologically. Otherwise, even the Bud­
dhist Noble Eightfold Path, the very disciplines whose features are phenom­
enal and axiological, would not make sense. Often times the radical teachings 
of Zen Buddhism on annihilating our moral codes can easily be misleading. 
For example, Lin-chi’s radical admonition: “ Do not do anything at all, not to 
’pursue’ anything at all even if it were Nirvana,” or “ Kill the Buddha.” 33
There is indeed enlightening insight to the truth o f the noble teachings of 
the Buddha in Lin-chi’s radical renunciation o f moral codes. However, it may 
be questioned whether the annihilation was meant to be ultimately for the 
affirmation or negation o f the samsaric, phenomenal, and moral life. The 
Dhammapada is all about the Buddha’s “ moral” teachings in this phenom­
enal life, which can hardly be thought o f as “negation” or “ renunciation” 
of social and ethical matters. J. N. Findlay also shares this point when he 
states:
The goal of a perennial philosophy is not to confine its limits to show­
ing the transcendent vision o f the Good in a mystical, immediate 
experience o f emptiness. The values in the mundane world must not be 
ironed out, but rather they must enrich the variety o f richness of
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mundane life in which the supra-mundane world is shone through.34
Good and Evil cannot be viewed as an individual concept alone and to that 
extent cannot be just an “ ontological” concept as Abe argues. It has necessarily 
social and ethical implications. As I see it, the communally-oriented Western 
philosophical idea of the Good which entails the axiology of good and evil, 
seems more appealing than the Buddhist individually-oriented ontological Em­
ptiness of good and evil. As Hegel criticizes Kantian ethics as a one-sided- 
individualistic ethics, so must the Buddhist ethics be critically and positively 
exposed to the communal, socio-ethical dimension. Otherwise, Buddhism would 
be lost in the eternal, indistinguishable darkness of Emptiness where “ all cows 
are black.”
Lacking any ethical concepts and thus to risk violating the norms, customs, 
and values of the phenomenal, worldly sphere is the very weakness and danger 
of Buddhism. I agree with J. N. Findlay when he says, “ Any philosophy that 
ultimately lacks on the clarity on the matter of values must not be taken to be 
genuine.” 35
Christianity and Western Philosophy have paid much attention to axiology, 
and the reason for this, in my mind, is that the Ultimate for Christianity is not 
Emptiness but Being in terms of God, who has a distinctively “ axiological” 
character, i.e., the Supreme Good. The marriage of ontology and axiology 
in Christianity may be a more persuasive philosophy than the Buddhist's 
philosophy of Emptiness. However, it goes without saying that Christianity 
has difficulty in dealing with the problem o f good and evil, i.e., the problem of 
theodicy. If God is the Author and the Preserver of Good and is the only Crea­
tor, then whence does evil come and who is responsible for evil? This problem 
of theodicy has been a major theological problem in Christianity and has been 
dealt with by many theologians, notably, Augustine and Ireneaus.36
Since the aim of this paper is not a detailed elaboration of Christian theodi­
cy, I shall leave the problem behind. Although Christian theodicy is as difficult 
a problem as the Buddhist Emptiness of Nirvana, there is a way of dealing 
with this issue of good and evil in Christianity because this world with its fun­
damental positive values is a creation of God who is Good, and therefore this 
world is good, and humans as the creation of the Good God are to be blessed 
to live in it. Though the sins of Eve and Adam degraded the first blessings, 
nevertheless the goodness of worldly matters is still preserved. Unlike the Bud-
M J. N. Findlay, Transcendence o f  the Cave, 198.
” J. N. Findlay, The Discipline o f  the Cave (New York: Allen & Unwin, 1969), 55.
* For a detailed elaboration of this subject, see John Hick, Evil and the God o f 
Love (New York and San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1952).
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dhist Samsara, this world for Christianity is not illusory; it is not to be negated 
or annihilated but to be valued positively because it is the creation of God, if 
Plotinus is right. This unity of the Judaic conception of God the Creator and 
Greek philosophy, i.e., the Platonic philosophy of Being as the Supreme 
Good—the marriage of ontology with axiology—has made Christianity a life­
affirming religion.
A  Defense o f  Platonism from  the Accusation o f  Dualism: 
The Marriage o f  Ontology and Axiology
We have seen how the antinomy of ontology and axiology in Buddhism has 
made it difficult for it to affirm this-worldly values. 1 would like to demon­
strate now how a Western philosophy in the Platonic tradition, which is admit­
tedly dualistic may in the end provide a more adequate solution than Bud­
dhism to the problem under consideration.
This may sound puzzling to those who are apt to think of Platonism as a 
life-negating philosophy inasmuch as the latter is characterized by the disdain 
of the bodily, earthly world in favor of the other-world.37 In spite of its ostensi­
bly dualistic orientation, there seems to me no better philosophy than 
Platonism with its identification of being and values to provide a positive ac­
count of the apparent reality o f this-world.
Plato saw Being as identical with Good. To this extent he may be said to 
have solved the antinomic view of the relation between Being and Good, i.e., 
between ontology and axiology. For Plato, the Idea of the Good as the vision 
to which all beings aspire, is the central part of his philosophy. What distin­
guishes Plato’s philosophy from Zen Buddhism is that the eidos (Form) is in­
ternally related to the Good; in other words, ontology and axiology are in­
separable. Since Christianity believes God as the Supreme Being and therefore 
the Good is the creation of God, the world is expected to be good though it 
may not be perfectly good. In light of this Platonic account of the goodness of 
the world, J. N. Findlay argues that the limitedness and one-sidedness of this 
life must not be removed or devalued:
37 It is commonly acknowledged that the Platonic dualism of Intelligible and Sensi­
ble worlds is something that should not have been done, and thus has to be overcome. 
The this-worldly matters are the copies of the otherworldly tide  (Forms) so the former 
is belittled in the overwhelming empowerment of the latter. Often times, and for the 
right reason, this disparagement o f this-worldliness of Plato has been a target of harsh 
criticism by other schools of philosophy. However, it is to be noted that though early 
Platonism may deserve this criticism, the developments in middle and later Platonism 
on this issue must not be overlooked.
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The this-world embodiments of types and values are, moreover, only 
embodiments of one type or value at the cost of not embodying 
another; sacrifice, one-sidedness, limitations is of the essence of this- 
world existence. This radical one-sidedness of realization can, of 
course, not be removed by any series, or system of embodiments, 
however varied or prolonged.58
As Buddhist Emptiness transcends relative good and evil, so does Platonic 
Good transcend all other forms of good such as truth, beauty, being, and es­
sence in the ever changing world of instantiation.59 The question at issue is, 
then, which philosophy would provide us with a more positive philosophical 
theory about the world of Samsara? I am inclined to say that it is Western 
philosophy in spite of its dualism, and not the nondualistic philosophy of Bud­
dhism. And yet, I must admit, neither the Buddhist philosophy of dependent 
origination and Emptiness nor the Platonic doctrine of the Idea of the Good is 
capable of providing a completely satisfying approach to the problem under 
consideration. Perhaps the truth lies in the middle way between the two.
Abe may argue that the Buddhist Sunyata does not belittle worldly values— 
his contention that ontology, not axiology, is fundamental to the Buddhist 
Dharma notwithstanding. He says that “ in the awakening to the boundless 
openness of Sunyata and the relativization and reversion of the good-evil dis­
tinction, the basis of the ethical life is not destroyed but is rather preserved, 
clarified, and strengthened.” 4 0  But this is a rather dangerous ethical stance be­
cause it obscures the moral distinction o f right and wrong. The basis of the 
ethical life is not “ preserved, clarified, or strengthened”  on the “ relativization 
of the good-evil distinction,”  but is rather obscured by it. Indeed it seems to 
leave the door wide open to the perversion and misuse o f the Vast Openness of 
Sunyata. I would like to maintain that there “ is”  such a thing as right and 
wrong in the phenomenal world. Although what is right and wrong may be 
taken as relative, being relative does in no way justify the total annihilation of 
moral standards. The Original Purity of one’s nature must not be misused for 
the justification of moral laxity and illness. For truly enlightened Buddhists, 
which, I am afraid, must be counted in the minority, going beyond good and 
evil may be fine. But the reality is that most humans are not enlightened and 
may never be. I am not, of course, suggesting here that one must give up the 
faith in the possibility of attaining Enlightenment in the here-and-now, as Lin-
w  J. N. Findlay, The Transcendence o f  the Cave, 180.
* See Plato’s Republic, VI, 509-b.
40 Abe, Zen and Western Thought, 152.
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chi so often exhorted his students.41 Ironically, though, the Buddhist relati­
vism based as it is on the belief in Sunyata and as aiming at transcending good 
and evil may yet be the very cause o f its own subversion.
41 I have discussed the problem of gradualism and subitism in Mahayana Buddhism 
in The Eastern Buddhist, 29-1 (1996), 66-84.
42 J. N. Findlay, The Transcendence o f the Cave, 182.
Thus the “ transcendence” o f relative good and evil must not be taken to 
mean the “ violation” or “ annihilation” of the existing social norms o f good 
and evil, though it may ultimately be illusory as long as it does not empty itself 
altogether into Emptiness. The transcendence o f good and evil in the samsar- 
ic, illusory, and phenomenal world must be understood in the Hegelian sense 
of “ sublation.” In other words, transcendence must include within itself what 
it transcends, i.e., the relative good and evil. In order for one to go beyond the 
relative good and evil, one must deal with the good and evil, not avoiding 
them or annihilating them altogether. J. N. Findlay says:
As Hegel rightly saw, absolutes and infinities that merely lie beyond 
the conditioned and finite, are also merely another case o f the con­
ditioned and finite: the true absolute must embrace and annul the 
conditioned and finite (italics mine), must leave no place for any­
thing beyond itself. This is not necessarily a pantheistic opinion: it is 
rather, as Hegel said of Spinozism, an acosmistic one, one that an­
nuls the cosmos.42
Findlay warns against this negative attitude toward the relativistic good and 
evil in Buddhistic solipsism. Findlay is not unaware o f the positive meaning of 
the Buddhist Emptiness. He seems right, however, in warning against the pos­
sibility o f the misuse o f Emptiness. In other words, though the phenomenal, 
relative good and evil are as illusory as samsara, by the same token they are 
also as real as samsara insofar as one must live with them and through them.
I maintain that the transcendence o f good and evil must be encouraged as a 
goal but not as the means to annihilate social engagements. Being liberated 
from good and evil thus must not mean, “ violating” social ethics, as Jesus is 
said to have come to this world not to abolish but to fulfill the law o f the 
world. But with a true understanding of the conditioned and imperfect nature 
of social ethics, and by means o f a positive and active investigation of and par­
ticipation in the samsaric and phenomenal world, one can truly become free 
and thus transcend relative good and evil. If perfection in the mundane world 
is presupposed as a necessary condition for perfection beyond this world, then 
this mundane life is to be “ worked out” and not to be “ ironed out,” as 
Findlay says.
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Though Zen Buddhism may argue that Buddhism does not negate Samsara 
as illusory, as the Madyamika school affirms the identification o f Samsara 
with Nirvana, I would like to maintain that the Buddhist view o f Samsara can 
only be positive if Nirvana is taken to be positive, i.e., not “empty.” But the 
very nature o f Nirvana is Emptiness, the Negative Ultimate. Thus insofar as 
the Buddhist Ultimate is negative, the nondualism of Samsara and Nirvana 
does not seem to make Buddhism a life-affirming religion. In defense o f Bud­
dhism as life-negating religion, Abe says:
Nirvana is not a negative or lifeless state such as the mere annihila­
tion o f human passion would suggest, but an existential awakening 
to egolessness, anatta or anatman, attained through liberation from 
craving, the attachment to the dualistic view which distinguishes be­
tween pleasure as something to be sought after and suffering as some­
thing to be avoided.43
Abe says that Buddhist ethics are beyond good and evil and thus value-tran­
scendent because they “ transcend” all axiological matters and are only onto­
logical. So the relative good and evil in this world is altogether emptied out 
into the Absolute Good which is Nothingness. This is where Christianity and 
Zen Buddhism take their different axiological turns. Christianity examines, de­
velops, and investigates the axiological matters o f this world, and this axiolo­
gy necessarily produces the social consciousness of otherness. Findlay rightly 
points out that the Platonic Cave World (which may be equivalent to the Bud­
dhist world of Samsara o f  ignorance) is the world with Others; i.e ., it is not a 
solipsistic world but a “ societal” world in which one finds oneself with other 
cave fellows.
Though Zen Buddhism says that social concern and social engagement are 
important in the perspective o f Nirvana, encompassing as it does the totality 
of “all” sentient beings, its over-emphasis on the individual awakening to the 
True Self o f Emptiness delays the concrete social awakening to Enlightenment 
with others. This lack o f social consciousness seems to be characteristic of 
Asian philosophy/religion in general. Hegel articulates this problem as fol­
lows:
The principal cultus for human beings [in this religion] is the uniting 
of oneself with this nothing, divesting oneself o f all consciousness, 
of all passions. This cultus consists o f transposing oneself into this 
abstraction, into this complete solitude, this total emptiness, this 
renunciation, into the nothing.44
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Conclusion
Though the Buddhist “ Emptiness” o f Nirvana and the Platonic-Christian 
“ Richness” o f Being may not be radically different in so far as they both are 
referred to the characterization o f the Absolute Freedom in which one finds 
one’s salvation, nevertheless there are important differences between them. 
This is so because Nirvana, the final goal of Buddhism, is a nullification of 
mundane things in the world.
J. N. Findlay, though acknowledging the valuative meaning o f the Buddhist 
Emptiness, is critical o f the Buddhist tendency o f belittling and denigrating or­
dinary experience and relationships.4 5 In emphasizing ontological Emptiness 
as the ultimate reality, Buddhism is deficient in giving an “ axiological”  ac­
count o f the “ richness” o f the mundane life in the phenomenal world.
44 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on Philosophy o f  Religion, one-volume edition, The
Lectures o f  1827, ed., Peter C . Hodgson and trans. R. F. Brown, P . C. Hodgson and 
J. N. Stewart (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1985), 256.
45 See, J. N. Findlay, Values and Intentions (New York: Allen & Unwin: 1961), 406- 
407.
44 Ibid. 406.
Findlay argues that the religious ultimate reality, which is best described in 
terms o f negativity in both East and West on account o f its transcendent 
characterization, must not result in the nullification o f ordinary values, ex­
periences and expressions in this world. Findlay says that Eastern religions, es­
pecially Buddhism, which make the end o f transcendentalism a mere illusion, 
is no less detrimental than Western philosophical nihilism. Findlay thus 
writes:
While in the West it has been mainly professed by philosophers, in 
the East it has had an authentic religious existence, where, to the pas­
sion for transcending existence, has been added the passion for put­
ting an end to the restless movement o f consciousness, to the endless 
variegation and frustration of conscious life, and to its basic differen­
tiation into an objective and subjective aspect.46
Findlay’s criticism o f Buddhist negativity seems fair to the extent that, 
although the nondualism of Samsara and Nirvana held by Mahayana Bud­
dhism is not much different from Findlay’s Hegelian reading o f the nondual­
ism o f the universal and the particular, nevertheless it is distinctively the 
Buddhistic character that the “negativity” is a fundamental category o f the ul­
timate, whereas Christianity can be characterized as a religion o f rich color.
One may argue that in the mystical, apophatic tradition o f Christianity, the
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“negativity” is undoubtedly present as the most appropriate way o f describ­
ing the unknowable God, as, for example, in the case o f Meister Eckhart’s 
kenotic theology. I maintain, however, that even the Eckhartian kenotic theol­
ogy is not equivalent to the Buddhist ontological Emptiness. The reason is 
that in Buddhism there is really nothing “ontologically” to be emptied from 
the outset, whereas in the Eckhartian kenosis, God, the Father who empties 
himself in the form o f human, Jesus, is an “ontological being.”
The recent attempts to assimilate Buddhist Emptiness into Christian Keno- 
sis by some comparative scholars such as Steve Odin is mistaken to the extent 
that the fundamental difference between the Buddhist ontological Emptiness 
and the Christian Kenosis is overlooked. Christian “ Kenosis” is a personi­
fication o f divinity; that is to say, God as Being, not as emptiness, became 
another being in a person, Jesus. And this Divinity as Being is not completely 
“emptied out” o f Divinity into Humanity, but is also “ preserved” in Jesus’ 
Humanity. If this were not the case, then the Nicene Creed o f  “ Jesus being 
both Divine and Human” would have lost its Christian identity. Thus I main­
tain that such attempt at the metaphysical comparability between Christianity 
and Buddhism in terms o f Emptiness/Kenosis cannot be sustained as a valid 
approach.47
I conclude from the above discussion that the Western philosophy o f 
Platonism and Christianity seems to provide a more adequate solution to the 
problem of good and evil than does the Zen Buddhist tradition o f Buddhism. 
This is so primarily because the former does not do away with the contingency 
and finitude of things in the world. When contingency and finitude are elimi­
nated, the reality and value o f things will be eliminated along with them. Let 
me conclude this essay by quoting Findlay again:
It is because o f this superbly outgoing, sensuous trend that Christian­
ity is so much a religion o f rich color. Its characteristic spirit shines 
from the many-coloured walls of San Vitale and Sant’ Apollinare in 
Classe, but it shines equally from the stained glass o f York and 
Cologne and the Sainte Ch apelie. It is the spirit o f a religion that be­
lieves in a transfiguration, rather than doing away with, o f this-world- 
ly things, a rendering o f man and society pervious to the light o f 
heaven, yet coloured with all the glorious shades o f earth.48
47 For the discussion on the Buddhist Emptiness and Christian Kenosis, See Steve 
Odin, “ Kenosis as a Foundation of Buddhist/Christian Dialogue/’ The Eastern Bud­
dhist 20-1 (1987): 71-86.
44 J. N. Findlay, “ Religion and Its Three Paradigmatic Instances,” Religious Stu­
dies, Vol. II (1975), 225.
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